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The cultural and institutional predominance of marriage in our society has lately been
challenged by two important social trends: growing dissatisfaction with or indifference to
marriage on the part of those eligible to marry, and the emergence of nontraditional
families headed by adults who may wish to marry but are presently excluded from doing
so. This Essay argues that proactive law reformers have responded to these trends by
taking two very different approaches. The first approach, “diversity of forms,” is
exemplified by the cultivation of alternatives and substitutes to traditional marriage
ranging from same and opposite-sex domestic partnerships and other forms of
“marriage-lite” to commitment-intensive options like covenant marriage. The other
approach, “equal inclusion,” emphasizes broader access to regular marriage itself, and
is exemplified by the egalitarian, civil rights-focused, and deeply marriage-affirmative
views of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public
Health. This Essay goes on to contend that although these two reform approaches are
quite different, they share a common vision of how the law of marriage and coupling
should be shaped by the social reality of citizens’ lives rather than by abstract traditional
archetypes, leaving both approaches more-or-less on the same side in the larger culture
war being waged over the future of marriage and family law. There is still potential for
serious conflict, however, because although both approaches are skeptical of idealized
tradition, they each remain nested in a diverse and disparate array of other aspirational
norms that may lead them to threaten each other’s long-term institutional agendas.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most widespread cultural debates taking place in the United States today
concerns the future of marriage and coupling.1 Its parameters are by now familiar to most
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observers, with supporters of “traditional marriage”2 poised at one end of the ideological
spectrum to do battle in the public arena with those advocating a variety of innovations, ranging
from the inclusion of same-sex couples,3 to the creation of alternative statuses,4 to the complete
abolition of marriage as a civil institution.5 Most of these innovations are themselves prompted
by underlying processes of social change that are viewed with suspicion by cultural
traditionalists,6 lending the entire debate a certain intractable quality common to many American
discussions of “social issues.” 7 The purpose of this Essay is not to weigh in on either side of the
marriage controversy, which has been a major battleground within the legal academy for a
generation, but to explore some of the complexities obscured by the polarization it has generated.
Two important social trends that have posed challenges to traditional marriage are the
growing dissatisfaction with or indifference to it on the part of a significant number of people
who could marry their partners, and the emergence of nontraditional families whose adult

Weiner for reading earlier drafts of this essay and offering many helpful comments and suggestions. Any remaining
errors are my own.
1
This essay focuses on marriage and “coupling,” despite the author’s awareness that at some point in the future the
two may actually come uncoupled. Polygamy was once a serious institutional alternative in the United States before
it was stamped out by Congress, with the eventual blessing of the Supreme Court. See Ariela R. Dubler, Immoral
Purposes: Marriage and the Genus of Illicit Sex, 115 YALE L.J. 756, 801-806 (2006); Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145 (1878). While it is once more a popular topic for conversation in the debate over same-sex marriage, unlike
same-sex marriage or the various marriage alternatives discussed below, polygamy has yet to secure the kind of elite
and popular backing that would give it a serious chance of being enacted in any state. For now, at least, marriage
and coupling remain exclusively intertwined as a matter of policy, and are thus the primary focus of this essay.
2
The term “traditional marriage” is used today by many conservatives to refer to the union of “one man and one
woman for life.” See Larry Cata Becker, Religion as the Language of Discourse of Same-Sex Marriage, 30 CAP. U.
L. REV. 221, 236 n.79 (2002) (quoting position statement of the Southern Baptist Convention). I also use it more
generally here to refer to marriage based on traditional commitment norms, regardless of the gender of the
participants.
3
See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Public Health, 440 Mass. 309 (Mass. 2003).
4
The American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 6.01
(2002) [hereinafter ALI Principles].
5
See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: The Pro-Marriage Case for Abolishing Civil Marriage, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 1161 (2006); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER: THE SEXUAL FAMILY
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 228-30 (1995).
6
Trends that figure most prominently into this debate include growing social toleration of homosexuality and
heterosexual sex outside of marriage.
7
See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 73 (1996) (describing abortion as an
example of a political debate so rooted in subjective morality that the two sides not only take different positions but
cannot agree on the basic terms of discussion).
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members may wish to marry but who are excluded from doing so by law. The primary law
reform efforts that have emerged in response to these trends can be conceptualized as two very
different legal and institutional approaches.8 The first might be called “diversity of forms.” It
originated with state court decisions extending private law contractual principles to certain
nonmarital conjugal relationships, but has since expanded to encompass an array of alternative
status frameworks, such as opposite-sex domestic partnerships (a form of “marriage-lite”); civil
unions, same-sex domestic partnerships, and other substitute institutions for those legally barred
from marrying; and, lastly, covenant marriage for those who want more legal and spiritual
commitment than “baseline”9 marriage can offer in the era of no-fault divorce. Although these
alternative status forms have come about through diverse means and with different and often
conflicting motivations, what unites them is a shared sense that the institution of marriage as it
currently exists is failing to meet the real needs of significant segments of the population and
must accordingly share the institutional stage with, or even be entirely replaced by, other forms.
This first approach has lately had competition, however, from a second movement, which
might be labeled “equal inclusion.” Equal inclusion focuses not on creating alternatives to
marriage but on making marriage itself more widely available. This point of view is exemplified
by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Goodridge v. Dept. of Public

8

Most of this Essay (except for Part IIIB) focuses on marriage reform efforts that have originated on the center-left
(with the exception of covenant marriage) because thus far they have dominated the reform agenda in the United
States. There has been more than occasional reform rhetoric on the right, notably about the need to modify divorce
requirements, and in the 1990s it may have seemed as if a full scale legislative assault on no fault divorce was
imminent. See James Herbie DiFonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 IND. L.J. 875, 916-920 (2000) (describing
“counterrevolution” against no fault). To date that assault has not arrived. The lion’s share of conservative political
efforts in recent years, while quite successful, has been devoted to the preservation of the status quo, i.e.
heterosexual marriage), despite the fact that in most states that status quo actually consists of an otherwise quite
liberal marriage regime. See infra note 12.
9
I use the term “baseline marriage” throughout this essay to refer to the liberalized version of marriage that exists in
most states today.
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Health10 declaring a right to same-sex marriage under the state’s constitution. Goodridge
represents a far different type of challenge to the baseline institution of marriage than the push
for diverse forms. On the one hand, the inclusion of same-sex couples in marriage may
significantly change the predominant conjugal form by eliminating some of its heretofore
defining characteristics, notably heterosexuality. Yet the focus on inclusion (rather than liberty,
or even abstract equality) also exalts marriage, transfixing it in the public consciousness as more
than a means to other ends but instead as an intrinsic public good in its own right.11
We are thus faced with two significantly divergent law reform efforts. Yet the choice
between the two is not as stark as that between “saving” traditional marriage and engaging in
some sort of proactive law reform. Both reform approaches have emerged from a common vision
of how the law of marriage and coupling ought to be shaped, a vision that deemphasizes the use
of conjugal forms to express abstract traditionalist archetypes in favor of legal and social
institutions that effectively respond to how citizens actually live their lives. They are thus, on one
level, two facets of the same reformist impulse. Nevertheless, the rejection of idealized conjugal
forms in favor of social reality does not equate to value-free institutional agnosticism. Both
reform approaches remain intertwined with a diverse and often disparate set of other normative
goals, ranging from the promotion of equality for marginalized groups, personal autonomy for
individuals, and pluralism among varying religious and cultural traditions, to the reinvigoration
of traditional mores and the reinforcement of a national sense of community through shared

10

440 Mass. 309 (Mass. 2003).
Recent decisions by other state supreme courts and by one federal court of appeals suggest that Goodridge may
not have the doctrinal influence for which its supporters might once have hoped. See Andersen v. King County, No.
75934-1, ---P.3d--- (Wash. 2006); Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, No. 05-2604, ---F.3d--- (8th Cir. 2006);
Hernandez v. Robles, ---N.E.2d --- (N.Y. 2006). These decisions do not lessen the importance of Goodridge as an
authoritative articulation of the legal and moral case for same-sex marriage. It is in fact precisely because the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court deployed rhetoric that so many would view as moral and political rather than
doctrinal that its decision remains important for the purposes of this essay, since the debate over same-sex marriage,
while it may be foreclosed by most courts, is likely to continue in the legislative arena. See infra note 60.
11
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social institutions. As battles over whether to reform the law of marriage and coupling rage on,
we should thus be aware that even if the forces for change win, the character of what they will
implement is likely to be contested for a long time to come.
Part I of this Essay describes the two dominant approaches to law reform in the area of
marriage and coupling that have emerged in response to changing social norms. Part II describes
how these approaches converge through a common vision with respect to the relationship
between the law’s role in shaping conjugal forms and the social reality of citizens’ lives. Part III
raises the possibility that various aspects of these two approaches may nevertheless threaten each
other’s long-term institutional agendas and explores two potential loci of future conflict.
I.

THE PREDOMINANT CONJUGAL REFORM APPROACHES
A. Diversity of Forms

Commentators tend to agree that the contemporary push in the United States to align the
law of marriage and coupling more closely with the reality of citizens’ lives is rooted in two
related developments from the mid-1970s: the advent of no-fault divorce through legislative
reform,12 and the increasing enforcement of contractual alternatives to heterosexual marriage by
many state courts, starting with the California Supreme Court’s famous decision in Marvin v.
Marvin.13 In an important article published almost fifteen years ago, Jana Singer identified both
of these trends as part of a larger privatization process taking hold of family law,14 one
encompassing a shift away from status-based family forms that regarded married partners as one
legal entity towards a more contractarian vision in which individual spouses were able to

12

California became the first state to adopt a no-fault framework in 1969. By 1985 no American jurisdiction
retained a purely fault-based system. Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443,
1472 (1992). Today unilateral no-fault divorce is available in all but four states. See Allen M. Parkman, The
Contractual Alternative to Marriage, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 125, 129 n.38 (2005).
13
18 Cal.3d 660 (Cal. 1976).
14
Singer, supra note 12, at 1445.
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preserve a great deal more of their social and legal identities.15 Although society’s push away
from status towards contract has abated somewhat, and may even have reversed course,16 these
two developments remain key family law watersheds.
Despite the importance of each of these developments, the legal forms resulting from
them experienced somewhat different institutional trajectories. No-fault marriage has become the
default rule in almost all states, a broad, one-size-fits-all model whose ubiquity appears matched
only by its frequent inability to please anyone on any side of the debate.17 Contractual
alternatives to baseline marriage have also become commonplace in several key areas, such as
the provision of health, pension, and other domestic partnership benefits to unmarried couples by
private companies and some government employers.18 Yet in other respects contractual
alternatives have continued to languish on the institutional margins, their uneven enforcement19
due in no small part to social insecurity generated by the progression of marriage itself towards a
more contractarian state.20
More recently, however, a new trend has emerged in the push for institutional alternatives
to the baseline model of marriage, with the focus this time going beyond the cultivation of
limited private law alternatives towards the creation of one or more quasi-marital alternative

15

Id. at 1462.
See Raymond O’Brien, The Reawakening of Marriage, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 339 (1999).
17
Baseline marriage, even in its liberalized form, continues to be critiqued from the left as either hopelessly coercive
and paternalistic or incapable of reckoning with the reality of familial dependency. See infra text accompanying
notes 26-27, 140-44. At the same time, those on the center and the right have decried the recent evisceration of
traditional commitment norms. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, No Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991
B.Y.U. L. REV. 79 (1991).
18
See Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation: Rights and Responsibilities in the
American Welfare State, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265, 1282-83 (2001).
19
Many states have simply refused to follow Marvin, while some have limited recovery to various types of express
agreements. See Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of Cohabitation
Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815, 817-18, 818 n.4 (2005)
20
See Singer, supra note 12, at 1456-65, 1475-76.
16
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statuses. The concept of status is commonplace in family law. 21 The term is used here to denote
state reinforcement of conjugal relationships going beyond the enforcement of private
agreements to the creation of more comprehensive, and not entirely voluntary, legal
relationships.22 Status in family law is intimately connected to the idea that individuals in
families should play certain “roles,” which can be defined as “behaviors that are characteristic of
persons in a context.”23 Commentators such as Milton Regan have argued for a revival of status
because it usefully fosters what Regan characterizes as a “relational” sense of obligation, i.e. a
sense of obligation that transcends the acontextual self to promote community and mutual
dependence.24 Even in the era of no-fault the archetypal conjugal status remains marriage. Yet
any type of alternative status available to couples is likely to carry the same attributes to some
extent and so might be able to compete much more directly with marriage than the enforcement
of private, largely economic agreements between unmarried couples.25
The emergence of different conjugal status frameworks as alternatives to or substitutes
for baseline marriage can be attributed to at least three broad developments. First, despite
society’s ambivalence towards contractual alternatives to marriage, the incidence of nonmarital

21

See Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1419,
1526-48 (1994).
22
Modern conjugal status relationships (in contrast to their antecedents and to other types of familial status
relationships like parenthood) can be considered voluntary in the sense that one must consent to enter into them.
Once entered into, however, they continue to carry involuntary consequences, because many of the rights and
obligations attached to them cannot be “unbundled” from each other even if the participants wish to do so. See
Margaret M. Mahoney, Forces Shaping the Law of Cohabitation for Opposite Sex Couples, 7 J. L. & FAM. STUD.
135, 159 (2005). Of course, some aspects of conjugal status relationships can be unbundled, as marriage and other
forms undergo a “utilitarian metamorphosis” that has made increased room for private ordering. See James Herbie
DiFonzo, Unbundling Marriage, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 31, 41 (2003). This process has had limits, however. For
instance, much of marriage, including the basic terms of a couple’s relationship and the grounds for dissolution, has
remained largely off limits for contractual modification. See Eric Rasmussen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil
of Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 460-64 (1998).
23
BRUCE J. BIDDLE, ROLE THEORY: EXPECTATIONS, IDENTITIES AND BEHAVIORS 56 (1979) (quoted in MILTON C.
REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 9 (1993)).
24
See REGAN, supra note 23, at 92-94.
25
Other scholars have in fact advanced visions of diverse state-supported intimate partnerships fostering equally
strong relational identities. See, e.g. Chai R. Feldblum, 17 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 139, 179-81 (2005).
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cohabitation among heterosexual couples has continued to rise,26 and with it the desire of many
law reformers to provide protection to such couples while their relationships last, to the weaker
parties on dissolution, and to other affected groups (notably minor children).27 This has produced
two broad sets of alternative status forms available to those who might otherwise marry. The set
that predominates in the United States takes what is usefully thought of as a “conscriptive”28
rather than a voluntary approach. It consists of de facto regimes established by various state
courts that automatically impose certain aspects of the marital relationship on long-term
cohabiting couples. The Supreme Court of Washington State, for instance, has held that property
acquired during heterosexual cohabitation is subject to equitable distribution if it “would have
been characterized as community property had the couples been married.”29 Other state courts
have reached similar results in more limited contexts.30 On a far broader scale, four years ago the
American Law Institute proposed that virtually all of the private benefits and obligations
currently reserved for marital relationships be automatically applied to certain unmarried
cohabitants.31
A second set of forms for unmarried heterosexual couples that is still uncommon in the
United States but growing in popularity abroad consists of voluntary domestic partnership
frameworks providing a kind of “marriage-lite” that couples may opt into through formal

26

The number of unmarried, opposite sex couples rose eight-fold from 1970 to 1998, from roughly half a million to
over 4.2 million. Blumberg, supra note 18, at 1268 n.11 (reprinting table from Census Bureau report).
27
See ALI Principles, supra note 4, at § 6.02 cmt. B; Martha L. Minow, Redefining Families: Who’s In and Who’s
Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 269, 282-83 (1991).
28
Garrison, supra note 19, at 818.
29
Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wash.2d 339, 351 (Wash. 1995).
30
See, e.g. Sullivan v. Rooney, 404 Mass. 160, 162-63 (Mass. 1989) (unmarried partner entitled under constructive
trust doctrine to one half interest in home where partners resided during cohabitation); Pickens v. Pickens, 490
So.2d 872, 875-76 (Miss. 1986) (homemaker had equitable claim to property accumulated during long-term, stable
cohabiting relationship).
31
ALI Principles, supra note 4, at §§ 6.03-6.06.
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registration. 32 Although in the United States this form has more often been enacted as a marriage
substitute for those who may not legally wed,33 it has also been conceived of as an alternative for
those who might otherwise marry but desire fewer of the bundled rights and obligations that
marriage entails.34 Today, a few American domestic partnership statutes do include some
heterosexual couples, although such inclusion is generally limited to those perceived to have
special requirements making marriage-lite particularly appropriate.35
In addition to heterosexual cohabitation, a second important development driving the
push for additional conjugal forms has been the increasing emphasis that advocates for gay and
lesbian rights have placed on securing legitimacy and support for same-sex couples.36 For a
variety of reasons, including both distaste in some parts of the GLBT community for marriage as
an institution and political opposition from other segments of society, these efforts have most
often culminated not in same-sex marriage but in the creation of parallel statuses reserved for
certain classes who are legally barred from marrying.37 These arrangements function as marriage
substitutes; they are available to those who may not legally marry their partners (usually samesex couples, although sometimes others in non-conjugal dependency relationships are also
included). Vermont’s civil union law and Hawaii’s reciprocal beneficiary law are well known
examples of the extremes of this type of regime in the United States. Both were compromise
solutions enacted as a response to litigation on behalf of same-sex couples seeking the right to
32

Garrison, supra note 19, at 866.
See infra text accompanying notes 36-47.
34
See Mahoney, supra note 22, at 163 (describing foreign domestic partnership laws that include opposite sex
couples).
35
Retirees, for instance, are more likely to be widowed and therefore precluded from remarrying if they want to
keep various federal benefits, and so they have sometimes been included. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West
Supp. 2005) (domestic partnership status available to heterosexual couples over the age of 62).
36
See GEORGE CHAUNCEY, WHY MARRIAGE: THE HISTORY SHAPING TODAY’S DEBATE OVER GAY EQUALITY
(2004).
37
Blumberg, supra note 18, at 1281 (describing domestic partnership and civil union legislation as “counterproposal” to same-sex marriage initiatives); see also Anemia Hartocollis, For Some Gays, A Right They Can
Foresake, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2006, at D9 (describing unfavorable view of same-sex marriage relative to civil
unions for some in gay and lesbian community).
33
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marry,38 but whereas Vermont’s civil unions law is limited to same-sex couples and purports to
bestow on them virtually all of the benefits and burdens of marriage,39 Hawaii’s reciprocal
beneficiaries framework is far narrower in substantive scope but open to many other pairings
who are equally ineligible to marry.40 Currently six states, the District of Columbia, and
numerous municipalities have some variation on one of these statutory regimes,41 and despite the
significant backlash against same-sex marriage42 it is likely that more state and local
governments will follow suit.43 One point of contention, however, relates to the permanence of
these statutory frameworks. Some gay and lesbian advocates, along with many of their
conservative critics, see them as fundamentally temporary compromises, a “down-payment”44 or,
depending on one’s viewpoint, a “slippery slope”45 towards same-sex marriage. Others may view
such alternatives as viable permanent solutions that address most of the needs of nontraditional
families while also preserving heterosexual marriage, 46 and perhaps the independence and
distinctiveness of sexual minority cultures.47

38

Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530 (Haw. 1993).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 §§ 1201-07 (2005).
40
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572C-4, 572C-6 (Michie 2005).
41
The other states to have enacted an alternative status primarily (although not always exclusively) for same-sex
couples are California, Connecticut, Maine, and New Jersey. See CAL. FAM. CODE ANN. § 297.5 (West 2005); Conn.
Pub. Acts 05-10 (Apr. 20, 2005) (effective Oct. 1, 2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A § 4249 (2006) ; N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 26-8A.2 (West 2005); see also D.C. STAT. § 32-701, et. seq. (2001); Mahoney, supra note 22, at 161 (as of
2005 thirty-five American municipalities had enacted domestic partner ordinances).
42
See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
43
Two additional states that appear likely to enact some form of alternative status for same-sex couples relatively
soon are Colorado and Maryland. See Myun Oak Kim, Values Divide Camps, ’06 Ballot: Separate Measures on Gay
Rights, Unions Could Pass, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Feb. 2, 2006, at 5A (describing efforts to pass civil unions bill in
Colorado); Sumathi Reddy, Gay, Lesbian Lobbyists Claim Victory, BALT. SUN, Apr. 15, 2005, at 1B (describing
passage of civil union bill in Maryland later vetoed by governor).
44
Press Release, National Organization for Women, Connecticut Legalizes Civil Unions for Same-Sex Couples,
available at http://www.now.org/press/04-05/04-21.html (quoting NOW Action Vice President Olga Vives)
[hereinafter NOW Press Release].
45
Lynn Waldsmith, Gay Marriage Draws Backlash, but Backers Note Growing Tolerance Among the Young,
DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 7, 2003, at 15A (quoting archdiocese spokesman).
46
See, e.g., Douglas W. Allen, An Economic Assessment of Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
949, 980 (2006).
47
See, e.g., Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When is Marriage the Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK, Autumn 1989, at 20.
39
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A final social development is the increasing dissatisfaction of social conservatives with
what marriage has become in the era of no-fault divorce, which has led them to push for a stricter
alternative to the baseline status, usually referred to as covenant marriage.48 Covenant marriage,
a heightened version of baseline marriage with increased barriers to both entry and exit, was first
enacted in Louisiana in 1997.49 The Louisiana law requires premarital counseling and other
special licensing procedures prior to a couple’s entry into marriage. Once married, the waiting
period for divorce absent traditional forms of fault is two years (as opposed to 180 days under
Louisiana’s baseline marriage law).50 Covenant marriage has made some progress since it was
first enacted,51 despite the initial suspicion it generated in many would-be supporters who
worried that it would weaken, devalue, and essentially compete with “normal” marriage.52
Although such fears appear to have abated,53 one of the most striking aspects of the covenant
marriage movement is its focus on institutional pluralism in lieu of simply reforming marriage
for everyone. Supporters have argued that part of the value of covenant marriage is the fact that it
gives a real institutional choice to those who want to infuse their relationships with a greater
level of binding spiritual and emotional commitment.54 Choice is actually one of the movement’s
driving themes; the very word “covenant” presupposes an entirely voluntary commitment, made
in this instance with the hope of securing meaning and lasting intimacy for one’s life.55 In a very
real sense then, although covenant marriage has been promoted in part as a means to make adults

48

See Joel A. Nichols, Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage Law: A First Step Toward a More Robust Pluralism in
Marriage and Divorce Law?, 47 EMORY L.J. 929 (1998).
49
Id. at 947-52.
50
Id.
51
Covenant marriage is now available in three states. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-801 (Michie 2004); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 25-901; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9: 234, 9:272-75, 9: 307-09 (West 2004).
52
Nichols, supra note 48, at 956 (recounting objections to Louisiana’s law voiced by many clergy).
53
At least to the extent that two other states passed similar laws.
54
See, e.g. Nichols, supra note 48, at 991-92.
55
See Marie Failinger, A Peace Proposal for the Same-Sex Wars: Restoring the Household to its Proper Place, 10
WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 195, 239 (2004).
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more moral and responsible,56 it has also been sold as a way to address the emotional and
spiritual needs of yet another segment of our society that feels alienated from marriage as it
currently exists.57 This focus on serving, rather than shaping, citizens’ existing needs as they
themselves perceive them has led at least one scholar to suggest that the covenant marriage
movement has more in common with liberal family law reform efforts than the supporters of
either might initially expect.58
The alternative status frameworks that have emerged to compete with baseline marriage
have originated from diverse sources, including those who feel the predominant conjugal form
inadequately copes with the full reality of heterosexual familial dependency, those who object to
its exclusion of gay and lesbian families, and those who are drawn to a more traditionalist moral
and spiritual vision. They are nevertheless united by a shared focus on institutional pluralism
driven by citizens’ real needs and desires. Lately, however, they have had competition from
another law reform movement.
B. Equal Inclusion
In a different vein, another, lately more high-profile push to reform the law of marriage
and coupling has focused not on institutional pluralism but on making the predominant form
more inclusive. The push for same-sex marriage is certainly not the only effort to reform baseline
marriage by changing its legal superstructure.59 Yet despite all of the controversy it has

56

See, e.g., Katherine Shaw Spaht, For the Sake of the Children: Recapturing the Meaning of Marriage, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1547 (1998).
57
E.g., Nichols, supra note 48, at 988 (describing covenant marriage as first step in a move towards “a more robust
pluralism” in the law of marriage and coupling)
58
Failinger, supra note 55, at 216.
59
There have been, for example, some efforts to do away with no fault divorce, or at least make it less available to
some couples. Supra note 8. As noted above, however, to the extent that cultural conservatives have focused on
positive law reform in this area, they have been more successful at creating institutional alternatives to baseline
marriage. There have also been less structural efforts, such as initiatives to promote a stronger “marriage culture.”
O’Brien, supra note 16, at 339.

12

engendered it is currently the most successful, both in the United States and in other parts of the
developed world.60
Marriage rights have been a component of the agenda promoted by many legal advocates
for the gay and lesbian community since the 1970s,61 not only because marriage still carries with
it significant benefits and obligations that are not otherwise available to couples, but also because
many perceive it as the key to achieving real dignity and respect for gay and lesbian relationships
and family choices.62 Yet the pro-same-sex marriage movement in the United States may be at a
crossroads. For the first time in its history it has achieved the complete realization of its vision in
one state, with the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s holdings in Goodridge v. Dep’t of
Public Health63 and In re Opinion of the Justices64 mandating same-sex marriage under the
state’s constitution. Even as it achieves such success, however, it is also under threat from a
considerable political and now judicial backlash.65 Perhaps as a result, the movement’s own

60

Only one state, Massachusetts, permits same sex couples to marry, see infra text accompanying notes 59-60. The
California legislature also passed a bill that would have provided for it, but it was subsequently vetoed by Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger. Nancy Vogel & Jordan Rau, Gov Vetoes Same-Sex Marriage Bill, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30,
2005, at 3. Yet given the significant regional support same sex marriage enjoys in the Northeast and on the West
Coast and the diminished chances of an outright federal ban, there is a strong possibility that same-sex marriage
will soon be the minority rule in multiple states. See Benjamin Wittes, Marital Differences, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
May 2006, at 46 (noting “quiet countercurrent” of support for same sex marriage and predicting that it will be
enacted in several states in the next ten years). Same-sex marriage is also becoming increasingly prevalent in other
parts of the developed world. See Anjuli Willis McReynolds, What International Experience Can Tell U.S. Courts
About Same-Sex Marriage, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1073 (2006) (describing enactment of same-sex marriage in South
Africa, Canada, The Netherlands and Belgium); Renwick McLean, Spain Legalizes Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, July
1, 2005, at A9.
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Center&CONTENTID=28225&TEMPLATE=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm. More recently, several
other state and federal courts rebuffed litigation strategies similar to that successfully employed in Massachusetts.
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rhetoric has shifted away from its traditional pose of substantive moral neutrality with respect to
lifestyle choices66 towards deeper affirmation of traditional marriage as an institution.67 This
shift has been reinforced by judicial rhetoric which appears even more disposed than that of
many advocates to frame marriage as an inherently positive social good.68 Thus, while the theme
of gay and lesbian legal equality remains in pro-same-sex marriage legal and political
discourse,69 the insistence that marriage, and only marriage, can vindicate the rights of same-sex
couples may have important implications for state-endorsed coupling generally.
Despite contrary disclaimers from some supporters,70 the inclusion of same-sex couples
in marriage necessarily carries with it the potential for significant transformation of the
institution. Indeed, before the issue achieved the national prominence it enjoys today, supporters
frequently argued to skeptics on the left that same-sex marriage was a worthy goal precisely
because it would be likely to divest traditional marriage of its roots in gender hierarchy.71
Although such transformational arguments from the left have been significantly muted, in the
See Andersen v. King County, No. 75934-1, ---P.3d--- (Wash. 2006); Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, No.
05-2604, ---F.3d--- (8th Cir. 2006); Hernandez v. Robles, ---N.E.2d --- (N.Y. 2006).
66
In a view typical of most same-sex marriage advocates until fairly recently, Tom Stoddard wrote: “First and most
basically, the issue is not the desirability of marriage, but rather the desirability of the right to marry.” Stoddard,
supra note 62, at 17.
67
Several commentators have written about the need to move beyond morally neutral liberal argumentation in the
push for gay equality. See, e.g., Carlos Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage: Looking
Beyond Political Liberalism, 85 GEO. L.J. 1871, 1930-31 (1997); Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Morality
and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 303 (1996). Such arguments obviously gained renewed
force in the wake of the 2004 campaign’s supposed emphasis on “moral values.” See, e.g., The Triumph of the
Religious Right, ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 2004, at 29. What is newer, however, is the focus of some same-sex marriage
advocates not on the worth of gay and lesbian relationships but on the inherent value of marriage. See, e.g.
JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE: WHY IT’S GOOD FOR GAYS, GOOD FOR STRAIGHTS, AND GOOD FOR AMERICA 2
(2004).
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See infra text accompanying notes 78-84, 88-91.
69
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Robin West, Universalism, Liberal Theory, and the Problem of Gay Marriage, 25 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 705, 727
(1998) (“Should same-sex marriage ever become a reality in this culture, it would ‘normalize’ the ideal of a for-life
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current debate similar arguments have been featured in rhetoric from the right, much of which
focuses on the possibility that same-sex marriage will further disaggregate the underlying
institution from procreation.72 Whether or not either assertion is true,73 it is far less debatable that
the inclusion of gay and lesbian couples in marriage at least moves marriage’s core definitional
relationship away from a heterosexual union between “one man and one woman” to an
omnisexual (or perhaps asexual) one between two “spouses.”74 Such formal gender neutrality,
even the Goodridge plurality and sympathetic dissenters in other state supreme court decisions
concede, stands in marked contrast to “long-standing” legal and cultural practices.75 Whether
such a change makes marriage “weaker” is a different question entirely, however. One might
imagine, on the one hand, that such a shift would reduce the specialness of marriage, thereby
cramping its ability to send a particularly positive message about monogamous heterosexual
unions and leading to its abandonment by many heterosexual couples.76 On the other hand, the
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more couples who can marry, the more marriage itself becomes a universal mean and therefore a
powerful vehicle for social ordering.77
The pro-marriage rhetoric deployed in Goodridge and other sympathetic decisions
arguably works to further the latter scenario.78 One of the ironies of the Massachusetts case, as
noted by a dissenting justice, is that for all the supposed doctrinal associations between same-sex
marriage and libertarian substantive due process in the vein of Griswold v. Connecticut,79 Roe v.
Wade,80 and Lawrence v. Texas,81 in the end marriage is about bringing the government into
people’s lives, not keeping it out.82 Inclusion and access, rather than autonomy, are dominant
themes in both the plurality and concurring opinions in Goodridge; the core of the injury
suffered by the plaintiffs is that they have been “arbitrarily deprived of membership in one of our
community’s most rewarding and cherished institutions” by a statute one of whose essential
functions is that of “gatekeeping.”83 The result is the perpetuation of an unacceptable hierarchy, a
“caste-like system” that cannot be justified by the “mantra of tradition” or “deeply held moral or
religious beliefs” standing alone.84 The decision and its most ardent defenders thus appear to be
channeling not the social libertarian jurisprudence of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts but the
equality-minded push for inclusion and access associated most clearly with the civil rights
movement and first-wave feminism. For example, Mary Bonauto, the attorney who argued the
case for the plaintiffs, summed up a recent law review essay defending the decision by quoting
77
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not Lawrence but United States v. Virginia.85 Like the integration of women at the Virginia
Military Institute, Bonauto argues, the push for same-sex marriage is part of “another chapter in
the story of our constitutional history,” which has been defined by “the extension of … rights
and protections to people once formerly ignored or excluded.”86 Even more telling,
Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney, the Goodridge decision’s most high-profile antagonist,
was dubbed by some the “George Wallace of the New Millennium.”87
This morally-charged, civil rights-focused approach to advocating for “marriage
equality” goes hand-in-hand with normative validation of marriage itself.88 Justice John M.
Greaney’s concurrence in Goodridge, for instance, calls marriage “an association for as noble a
purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.”89 Likewise, dissenting from the Washington
Supreme Court’s decision to deny same-sex couples the right to marry, Justice Bobbe Bridge
maintained that “civil marriage anchors an ordered society.”90 This type of judicial marriage
affirmation is echoed by most supportive commentators, some of whom have written openly of
the salutary effect they hope same-sex marriage will have on those LGBT people (particularly
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gay men) whose marginality has left them alienated from traditional values.91 Marriage, these
commentators have asserted, is the “foundation of civilization,” which means that the exclusion
of any eligible group like homosexual couples does nothing but alienate a segment of the
population from the “key values and commitments” upon which the community as a whole
depends.92
Andrew Koppelman has described this push for equal inclusion in the communal vision
marriage represents as the “normative” aspect of the push for marriage equality,93 which he
contrasts with its “administrative” aspect (roughly the quest for equal access to the particular
benefits that marriage bestows).94 Although they are two sides of the same movement, these two
aspects are rooted in distinct institutional visions, a fact evidenced by the reactions of same-sex
marriage proponents to any mention of a civil unions compromise. If marriage were only an
aggregation of benefits and burdens to which same sex couples were morally entitled on equality
grounds, one might expect few objections to bestowing its substance under a different name. The
rhetoric of “segregation” and “separate but equal” deployed in response to this suggestion
indicates otherwise.95 The essence of this perspective, as political commentator Jonathan Rauch
intones, is that “for gay people, civil unions and the like are a seat at the back of the bus.”96
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In sum, because marriage is a “social institution of the highest importance,”97 one that
binds citizens together through common ideals and experiences, the right to participate becomes
integral to sharing in society’s common vision of the family.98 The rhetoric of inclusion and
integration, unlike that of equal benefits, presupposes the existence of a valuable shared
institution. Writing about marriage generally, Milton Regan has argued for the reinforcement of
marriage as status and the rejection of contract because the former offers “a model of identity
defined in terms of communal norms, which can root the self in context.”99 In a later chapter of
his book Regan makes a point of including same-sex couples in this vision, but he urges
advocates to focus on the substantive value that marriage has in people’s lives rather than on the
abstract right to self determination.100 The approach Regan urges has in large part been adopted
by the judges and advocates who are driving the current push for equal inclusion of same-sex
couples in marriage. Somewhat ironically, the overarching institutional vision these actors
espouse has much in common with the traditional marriage revival for which many of their most
ardent conservative opponents long.101 From both of these perspectives, marriage is not so much
a path to achieving other social goods but a profound social good in its own right, the one
conjugal form supported by the weight of tradition and common social practice. It thus, quite
appropriately, occupies a central position in our society. This addition of liberal reformist voices
to the call to reaffirm our commitment to marriage, traditional or otherwise, may be the most
truly significant consequence of the equal inclusion approach, not only for gay and lesbian
couples, but also for the heterosexual majority.
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II.

CONVERGENCE: SOCIAL REALITY AND PRAGMATISM

We are thus confronted with two very different conjugal reform approaches, defined by
far different visions of the role of marriage as the predominant form. Before any further
exploration of what divides these visions can take place, however, it is important to be clear
about what unites them. What these visions share is a common impulse to address “the
disjunction between a wide range of lived experience and the law,”102 by moving state
endorsement of conjugal relationships away from a basis in idealized traditional archetypes
towards one rooted in the social reality of citizens’ lives.
Despite all the marriage-affirmative moral rhetoric of the Goodridge court and its
supporters, one aspect of the decision does rest heavily on the persuasive weight of morallyneutral social reality: its treatment of the plaintiffs’ sexuality. Although the tone of the decision
is broadly gay-affirmative, no portion of the plurality or concurring opinions actually addresses
itself to the morality of homosexual conjugal relationships or their suitability as a basis for
family life.103 Instead the decision’s reasoning is predicated on deference to “the changing
realities of the American family,” a set of pre-existing conditions that set the stage and then drive
the law forward but cannot themselves be contested as appropriate objects for the less benign
aspects of the law’s power.104 One might argue that this constitutes the decision’s true
“libertarian” side and its link to the Supreme Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence.
Quoting Lawrence, the plurality argues that it is obliged to “define the liberty of all,” an
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unspoken corollary being that it must take the “all” as it finds them, rather than seeking to
“mandate our own moral code.”105 In this respect the rhetoric of Goodridge resembles that of
Marvin, where the California Supreme Court justified its decision to enforce an implied contract
between unmarried cohabitants by concluding that “the mores of…society have indeed changed
so radically…that we cannot impose a standard based on alleged moral considerations that have
apparently been so widely abandoned by so many.”106 It also parallels the approach of many
advocates for heterosexual domestic partnership, whose agenda tends to be motivated less by
moral approval for nonmarital cohabitation than by the sense that, for better or worse, that
lifestyle takes the functional place of traditional marriage in many peoples’ lives.107
The approach of the Goodridge and Marvin courts and of many other family law
reformers is usefully contrasted with that taken in a recent document put out by the Catholic
Church’s Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. The document, which is signed by Cardinal
Joseph Ratzinger (now Pope Benedict XVI), articulates the Church’s opposition to the
recognition of homosexual unions.108 One of its key points pertains to the fact that same-sex
relationships already exist. For the Church, this reality, or even the belief that gays and lesbians
may deserve “respect,” can never be a justification for granting their relationships formal
legitimacy, because family law exists not to simply defer to people’s choices but to impose
“structuring principles” based on a higher moral and spiritual vision.109 That vision emphatically
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does not include same-sex sexual relations, and it never will. The Church’s view, particularly as
it applies to same-sex marriage, has been echoed by a number of conservative legal scholars in
the United States, especially those affiliated with the New Natural Law movement.110 The view
they share of same-sex marriage runs parallel to many of the “moral relativism” charges that
have also dogged domestic partnership and other alternative status arrangements, which have
likewise been portrayed by critics as a betrayal of the fundamental morality underlying state
support for traditional marriage.111
What this rhetorical divide suggests is that, broadly speaking, the two dominant
approaches to conjugal reform come down on the same side of the underlying debate about how
law should respond to evolving social trends in family formation. Both posit the appropriate
stance as partially reactive and partially proactive: the law should take evolving trends into
account rather than trying to ignore or reverse them wholesale, but then impose limiting
institutional mechanisms that protect other priorities like fairness, communal cohesion, familial
stability and socio-economic security for the vulnerable.112 Whether this stance can be broadly
equated with a retreat from “morality” as a basis for law is doubtful. A number of influential
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scholars have pointed to what they perceive as a shift away from traditional norms based on
religion, duty, and abstract ideals of behavior towards a more pragmatic vision centered on
individual psychological well-being, choice, and the pursuit of “happiness.”113 Yet this shift
appears to be less away from morality than towards a different moral “vocabulary,”114 one
focused less on the preservation of artificial forms and more on supporting families as they
actually exist.115 This new family morality sometimes privileges care, commitment, and sacrifice
over individual autonomy, self-actualization, and equality, although not always. 116 What is
ultimately important is that even when it champions “traditional” values, it perceives itself to be
responding to real social imperatives rather than upholding abstract ideals.117
In other words, one might imagine the two dominant approaches to reforming the law of
marriage and coupling as equally representative of a partial realignment away from aspirational
morality towards situational morality in family law, away from family law as the enforcer of
binding premises tailored to archetypal situations towards a less judgmental but more
comprehensive regulatory framework. From a vantage point that emphasizes this shared
pragmatism, the movement to further universalize marriage and the movement to create
alternatives to it, far from being mutually exclusive, appear as nothing more than products of
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different citizens’ choices and the state’s corresponding need to support and regulate them. The
ideal world they might produce would be one in which many couples could select from a diverse
array of institutional alternatives, a “menu of choices”118 based on their particular cultural
expectations, preferred level of commitment, desire to make a particular moral or spiritual
statement, etc.119 Such a framework would include a refortified traditional marriage, along with
other status alternatives, and might even be supplemented with a background regime of implied
obligations attaching in certain un-formalized cohabitation settings.120 It could even vary in
terms of which options were available to whom. What is essential is that the law of marriage and
coupling would not be based on idealized vestigial taboos but on patterns in actual family life. In
this way the two reform approaches might conceivably come together to create one multilayered
system that actualized both of their institutional agendas.
If the above scenario seems naïve and farfetched, it may be because the shift away from
aspirational morality towards situational morality has been at best partial. For example, even
supporters of covenant marriage who have championed pluralism admit that one of the ultimate
purposes of enacting a covenant marriage law is to push people towards what these proponents
view as morally better behavior.121 By embracing pluralism and moral and spiritual autonomy
they may signal their awareness that a satisfactory one-size-fits-all approach to conjugal
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relationships is not feasible,122 but they are also quite self-consciously articulating a universal
ideal. Proponents of “marriage equality” are no different; their own retreats into formalistic
neutrality are rarely able mask their substantive embrace of gay and lesbian family life and also
of baseline marriage itself as a valuable shared social institutions.123 The final section of this
Essay explores the potential for such underlying normative goals to generate new conflicts over
the law of marriage and coupling that may very well outlast today’s battles between idealized
tradition and pragmatic innovation.
III.

CONFLICTS: EQUALITY & COMMUNITY VS. AUTONOMY & PLURALISM

Ultimately, a shared conception of how family law should recognize and respond to
social change may not be sufficient to make diversity of forms and equal inclusion compatible,
for each reform effort is powered not only by a pragmatic desire to make the law of marriage and
coupling more responsive to citizens’ needs, but also by normative advocacy for an array of
disparate values and institutions. The result is a brand of normative conflict that is subtler, but
potentially no less enduring, than the pitched battles over social change that attract most attention
today. Already we can see these more muted conflicts appearing at crucial moments, particularly
when secular egalitarian and communitarian values driving the push to universalize one form of
marriage clash with the more diverse normative impulses of those on both the left and the right
who advocate for more than one conjugal form. The remainder of this Essay is devoted to
exploring two likely sites for such conflict: the debate over whether gay and lesbian couples
should be included in marriage or given a substitute status and that over whether heterosexuals
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should be allowed to create multiple forms of legal marriage to accommodate religious, cultural,
and ideological differences.
A. Same-Sex Marriage vs. Marriage Substitutes
The debate over whether same-sex couples should be included in marriage or given a
separate status like civil unions or domestic partnerships is often portrayed as being mainly about
pragmatic compromise: should those in favor of same-sex marriage insist on nothing but the full
realization of their agenda, or can they live with imperfect but more immediately feasible
solutions like civil unions or domestic partnerships?124 Should those opposed to homosexuality
block all formal recognition of homosexual relationships, or permit civil unions in the hopes of
preserving at least marriage as exclusively heterosexual?125 Yet there are also normative
arguments that support the creation of a substitute status for same-sex couples as preferable to
either denying them all formal recognition or including them in baseline marriage. To the extent
that such arguments gain increasing force, the potential for fundamental conflict over how, rather
than whether, the law should recognize nontraditional conjugal pairings is likely to grow.
As we have seen, one byproduct of the marriage-as-a-civil-right approach favored by
much of the gay and lesbian legal establishment and embraced in Goodridge is the corresponding
denigration of any other conjugal alternative,126 often employing the familiar phrase “separate
but equal” as shorthand for the argument that civil unions or another marriage substitute will
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relegate same-sex couples to second-class citizenship.127 The expositors of this position could be
accused of a certain formalistic lack of nuance. The evil that lay behind the legal doctrine of
separate but equal as it was originally employed was rooted in its fundamental hypocrisy as
much as anything else, since the primary function of the regime that it spawned was the
perpetuation of a racial caste system.128 Similarities between this caste system and the creation of
parallel conjugal forms through which the state facilitates similar, but perhaps not identical,
modes of family formation may therefore appear tenuous.129
The suspicion directed by same-sex marriage advocates towards civil unions and other
substitute forms becomes more comprehensible with consideration of how easily such forms can
be used to moderate but also preserve the primacy of heterosexual unions. Although most social
conservatives continue to oppose any state recognition of nontraditional coupling,130 a growing
minority have embraced alternative forms as a means for society, in the words of Jean Bethke
Elshtain, to recognize “plural possibilities” without adopting the normative view that “each
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alternative is equal to every other with reference to specific social goods.”131 Elshtain concedes
that same-sex conjugal relationships may be advantageous for some individuals, but she insists
that they are cut off from marriage’s capacity for social regeneration because they are inherently
non-procreative. Consequently, they do not deserve equal recognition.132 More hard-edged
commentators like Teresa Stanton Collett have gone even farther. Collett argues that society has
“no stake” in any sexual pairing that is by definition incapable of producing biological
offspring.133 Where such pairings lead to “mutually supportive” relationships they may
nevertheless merit some formal affirmation, but in her view there is no defensible reason to
distinguish based on the presence or absence of sexual activity.134 The reciprocal beneficiary
regime she advocates (which is roughly equivalent to that enacted in Hawaii135) not only
relegates stable, monogamous same-sex relationships to a subordinate status, but also denies
them any sort of “conjugal” quality entirely by lumping them together with a variety of platonic
intimate associations.
To support their positions both Collett and especially Elshtain rely heavily on empirical
observations about differences between same and opposite-sex relationships, particularly the fact
that same-sex couples cannot conceive biological children together.136 Each might therefore
claim she is advocating for nothing more than reasonable institutional variance based on the
needs of fundamentally different kinds of relationships. Yet such empirical distinctions are
extremely difficult to disentangle from the normative agendas of either side. The procreation
argument, for example, has been forcefully rejected by most advocates for gay and lesbian
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equality given the inability or unwillingness of many heterosexual couples to procreate and the
fact that children, biological or not, are present in many families headed by same-sex couples.137
Such advocates are equally suspicious of other traditionalist empirical arguments against samesex marriage, partly because many of these arguments do not seek to portray same-sex
relationships as simply different, but instead strive normatively to link them to family decline by
alleging that they possess a variety of negative characteristics, such as instability, potential for
domestic violence, or even inherent “selfishness.”138 Even if any of these characterizations were
true, equality advocates argue, they are at best the products of discrimination rather than valid
justifications for it.139 For such advocates, any acceptance of diverse forms based on supposed
differences between same and opposite-sex relationships is thus fraught with peril, for while
marriage substitutes may provide practical benefits for gays and lesbians, they also reify the
faulty empirical assumptions that fuel their subordination.
Yet the institutional alternative fielded by most of these advocates, inclusion of same-sex
couples in marriage, may be equally problematic from at least two other reformist perspectives.
First, there are the non-conformists. Many critics of marriage have argued that it perpetuates an
even more forceful type of stigma than does a hierarchy of conjugal forms, one that not only
devalues outsider relationships but actively seeks to restructure them along different, more
socially preferred lines. This is the primary reason that it has been under continuous attack from
radical queer and feminist theorists, who have consistently dismissed the notion that marrying is
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nothing more than a “personal choice” adopted by wholly autonomous individuals.140
Interestingly, although supporters of marriage equality have sometimes tried to refute such
arguments,141 an increasing number of them have actually embraced a modified coercive ideal.
They, like many traditionalists, approve of what Robin West terms the “communitarian and
communal nature of marriage,”142 i.e. its capacity to “channel” people away from selfish towards
self-giving behavior of which the community at large approves.143 Their aspiration is to
disaggregate this type of positive social coercion from the negative consequences resulting from
antiquated gender and sexual orientation hierarchies.144
Marriage, in other words, is at least tacitly accepted by even its liberal supporters to be a
force for social control through its valorization of particular types of relationships (committed,
monogamous, non-consanguineous dyads at its most inclusive) and stigmatization or even
pathologization of many others. The promotion of a one-size-fits-all marriage regime will
therefore be threatening to those who feel their relationships and families do not conform to the
social values that marriage emphasizes. This may be true even where baseline marriage is not the
only conjugal form available, since the availability of one alternative that has the backing of
tradition and common social practice is likely to devalue other options.145 To the extent that the
universalization of marriage undermines individuals’ liberty to chose alternate forms tailored to
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alternate lifestyles, it may threaten the goals and values of many nonconforming communities as
much as diverse forms threaten the aims of same-sex marriage advocates.
In addition to the non-conformists, the other reformist group who might oppose same-sex
marriage is made up of those who could be called “moderate traditionalists.” These individuals
are not necessarily opposed to gay and lesbian equality, but they also embrace the traditional
heterosexual family. They may note that there remain (at least for the moment) observed
differences between many same and opposite-sex couples (to say nothing of differences between
male and female same-sex couples). Some of these differences, such as higher separation rates
for same-sex couples, are deeply contested, and even if real might be attributed to the
psychological damage wrought by social stigma or to the fact that most same-sex couples
currently lack access to any stabilizing conjugal form.146 Yet there are also other less emotionally
charged variations, such as the increased likelihood that both members of a same-sex couple will
work147 and the decreased likelihood that the couple will have children,148 and these differences
could easily be viewed in a more benign light.149 Benign or not, however, all such differences
could be relevant to whether baseline marriage should be expanded to encompass same-sex
relationships. As Douglas Allen has recently argued, many people may believe that the
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traditional model of marriage was designed and is largely optimal for heterosexual families.150
Assuming there are some differences between same and opposite-sex couples, Allen contends
that we should be wary of including both in the same institution, because doing so could either
force same-sex couples to fit into a model of marriage ill-suited to some of their needs, or
empower them to force changes through either litigation or legislative reform that would make
marriage worse for many heterosexuals.151
Of course, it could be that all differences between same and opposite-sex couples that
appear salient now will in fact turn out to be irrelevant or illusory.152 Moderate traditionalists like
Allen nevertheless argue that the unexpected consequences resulting from past family law
changes, such as the creation of no-fault divorce, mediate in favor of caution.153 Moreover, rather
than rejecting same-sex marriage outright, he offers an innovative solution: create a parallel
institution for same-sex couples (which he dubs “homosexual marriage”) that is initially identical
to traditional marriage but allowed to develop separately through the process of common law
rulemaking.154 This alternative would invest same-sex marriage with all of the rights,
obligations, and qualities of baseline marriage, but it would also control for any potential adverse
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consequences that could result from drawing absolutely no distinctions between same and
opposite-sex relationships.155
Allen’s proposal is likely to be deeply offensive to many advocates for same-sex
marriage, not only because of the potential for lingering informal social hierarchy,156 but also
because a separate form of “homosexual marriage” offends the basic communitarian impulse to
create a broader, more inclusive vision of marriage to reinforce that form’s role as a unifying
social force.157 Yet so long as “homosexual marriage” is approached honestly as an attempt to
deal with the needs of particular communities without compromising the needs of the rest of the
population, it is exactly the type of pluralistic solution likely to be embraced by those who have
few principled objections to gay and lesbian equality but who are also wary of changes to
baseline marriage in its present form. These individuals, like the non-conformists who want
nothing to do with marriage, may be the most enduring opponents of the same-sex marriage
movement.
B.

Heterosexual Marriage Pluralism

A second locus for potential conflict between the two dominant reform approaches has
been furnished by the rise of heterosexual marriage pluralism. Pluralism with respect to entry
into heterosexual marriage is not a new phenomenon in this country, as evidenced by the
widespread acceptance of common law marriage during the nineteenth and first half of the
twentieth centuries.158 Nor is diversity in the substance of marital obligations, which has been
achieved on a limited basis through private contracting.159 What is relatively new, however, is
the idea that states should create or actively enable the private creation of one or more formalized
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alternative marriage statuses to compete directly with baseline marriage as it now exists,160 or
even to replace it entirely. Such proposals are likely to create tension among reformers where the
broadly egalitarian aims of pro-marriage liberals run up against the desire to revive religious or
other traditional values underlying many proposed alternative forms of marriage. More
generally, tension is also likely to result from the clash between desires for individual and
communal autonomy on the one hand, and broader communitarian goals on the other.
Advocacy for heterosexual marriage pluralism is not the unique province of either the left
or the right. On the left, for example, Barbara Stark has proposed the creation of “postmodern
marriage,” marriage whose substance is tailored to the particular ideological, cultural, and
personal values of couples, with the explicit goal of avoiding cultural “metanarratives” in order
to accommodate the needs of a diverse society.161 At the same time, baseline heterosexual
marriage itself has become significantly more open to many left values like secularism and
gender equality.162 It is therefore unsurprising that strong traditionalists are the ones who appear
most alienated from the predominant conjugal form; their feelings may only be amplified if it
continues to embrace ever more socially progressive definitions of family.163 This disaffection
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has already produced the covenant marriage movement described above,164 and other proposals
may follow. For example, several commentators have called for changes in the law to allow
enforcement of comprehensive prenuptial agreements rooted in explicitly sectarian religious
frameworks.165 Such agreements would in essence effectuate the contractual assumption of status
relationships by their parties, delegating jurisdiction over these relationships to specific religious
institutions, which would then perform many of the mediative and regulatory roles currently
performed by the state on the basis of their own laws and strictures.166
From the pragmatic reformist perspective described in Part II of this Essay, the most
compelling argument for such proposed alternatives for heterosexual couples focuses on the need
for institutional flexibility in light of substantial diversity among even “traditional” families with
respect to lifestyles, aspirations, and norms.167 In a nation as diverse as ours, many left
libertarians and traditionalists argue, some provision has to be made for those whose values
differ from the moderate liberalism embraced by baseline marriage. Such individuals have an
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autonomy interest in being able to structure binding conjugal relationships as they see fit, 168 and
society as a whole has a regulatory interest in helping them to do so.169
It seems unlikely, however, that traditionalist advocates for marriage pluralism will be
able to disaggregate their goal of autonomy for their own constituencies from their broader
normative advocacy for traditional values that conflict with the egalitarian beliefs of many liberal
marriage advocates.170 Most of covenant marriage’s most ardent sponsors, for example, openly
admit that their goal is not just to secure more options for the traditionally-minded, but to sway
all people to live their lives according to the values that covenant marriage represents.171
Although these values could be described in terms of generic commitment and protection of the
vulnerable (i.e. children), opponents will argue that they are at least tacitly linked to traditional
gender roles, because focusing on commitment discourages the type of spousal autonomy that
first gave rise to women’s liberation, and women continue to be subject to a variety of social
norms that encourage them to invest more of their personal resources in marriage and family life
than do men.172 Moreover, the practice of covenant marriage thus far has frequently been
associated with traditional Judeo-Christian religious values that also encourage sexual
inequality.173 Entrance into a covenant marriage may thus signal at least partial backtracking
from the liberal, sexually egalitarian values of baseline marriage.
For covenant marriage opponents, the question then becomes whether such entrance is
truly voluntary. Some have charged that enacting a covenant marriage alternative could
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essentially institute a “two-tiered marriage structure” 174 that devalues egalitarian marriage as
“less committed” than the covenant alternative. Such devaluation could result not only in social
stigma but even a kind of “marital sub-status” discrimination175 on the part of both government
and the private sector in everything from insurance rates, to tax consequences, to wrongful death
awards, to adoption and child custody. Similar types of discrimination are currently practiced
with respect to married and unmarried individuals based on the supposed benefits of marriage,176
so there is no reason to think they could not also develop between “more” and “less” committed
marriages. Opponents of covenant marriage, or any other type of tradition-oriented alternative
form, might accordingly feel justified in questioning whether the creation of such an alternative
would truly be a shift towards pluralism rather than simply a more gradual means to compel all
family life to return to more traditional hierarchies.177
Ironically, however, even where proposals for marriage pluralism are clearly not
motivated by expansionist aspirations for traditional values, pro-marriage liberals may still greet
them with increasing hostility, because these advocates have their own normative plans for
family life in which marriage is playing a more and more central role. Many socially liberal law
reformers have come to view marriage as a “foundation of civilization,”178 and a repository for
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what they consider to be positive social values like commitment and gender equality.179 It is
therefore reasonable to expect these advocates to become increasingly unfriendly to the
autonomy claims of groups who feel alienated from the predominant form.
Ultimately, like same-sex marriage, heterosexual marriage pluralism raises the
fundamental question of “what is marriage for?”180 Their present emphasis on procreation
notwithstanding, cultural conservatives have always responded that one of the things marriage
was for was the inculcation of communal values and civic virtue.181 Many pro-marriage liberals
now appear to agree. Even as they strive for social institutions that more fully reflect the reality
of American family life, they may therefore become more skeptical of some people’s realities
than they are of those of others.
CONCLUSION
The future of marriage and the alternatives is uncertain. The emergence of a significant
segment of the American population who are, for a variety of reasons, disconnected from
marriage as it currently exists has triggered a serious discussion about the meaning and future of
the predominant conjugal form. Although lately the most high profile aspect of this discussion
has been the controversy over whether baseline marriage should be expanded to include samesex couples, we should not lose sight of the more longstanding debate over marriage’s basic
institutional primacy. Both challenges to the paramount status of marriage and the push to make
it more inclusive are part of a larger shift in family law away from traditionalist aspirational
morality towards a more flexible normative vision that responds to the realities of citizens’
179
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intimate lives. This vision does not equate to value-free pluralism, however; on the contrary,
both reform approaches discussed in this Essay remain driven by a diverse set of other normative
goals, many of which are certain to generate conflict with the long-term institutional agendas of
those sympathetic to the other approach.
Intractable polarization has lately become a kind of metanarrative in American politics,
and no set of issues seems to provoke stronger and more seemingly fundamental disagreements
than those surrounding the future of marriage and the family. One purpose of this Essay has been
to suggest that many of these disagreements are more contingent than they appear. The law of
marriage and coupling is in a state of flux: even as many liberal reformers have moved gradually
away from pluralism, some conservatives appear to have discovered it. At the same time, many
on the right remain committed to baseline marriage, and to the project of reinforcing it as the
paramount or even exclusive means for conjugal family formation.182 At least some of these promarriage conservatives may become more open to innovations like same-sex marriage if such
innovations prove to reinforce rather than undermine marriage as an institution.183 Moreover,
although pro-marriage conservatives have yet to gain political traction for their more sweeping
proposals, such as the general abolition of no-fault divorce, if and when they succeed in doing so
they, like pro-marriage liberals, may encounter unexpected opposition from normally
sympathetic constituencies.184 If such developments come to pass, we might see a fundamental
shift away from legal and political battles that pit tradition against innovation, towards conflicts
focused more on uniformity versus pluralism. Alternatively, there might be some sort of
accommodation, with a newly strengthened marriage coexisting with one or more alternative
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forms geared toward particular subcultures. Or, in the end, the staying power of tradition may be
such that the battles of today are also those being fought twenty years from now. Regardless, the
future may look nothing like what today’s reformers expect.
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